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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. S h o u l d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t h a v e e x c l u d e d e v i d e n c e 
o b t a i n e d f r o m a w a r r a n t l e s s s e a r c h of t n e m o t e l r o o m w h e r e t h e 
a l l e g e d c r i m e o c c u r r e d ? 
2 . S h o u l d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t fiave e x c l u d e d t h e r e c e i p t 
of t h e p r e l i m i n a r y e x a m i n a t i o n t e s t i m o n y of t h e m a i n p r o s e c u t i n g 
w i t n e s s ( a ) as v i o l a t i v e of D e f e n d a n t ' s j r i g h t of c o n f r o n t a t i o n of 
w i t n e s s e s , or ( b ) b e c a u s e t h e S t a t e didi n o t s h o w t h e w i t n e s s to 
be u n a v a i l a b l e u n d e r U t a h R u l e s of E v i d l e n c e , R u l e 8 0 4 ? 
i i i 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
WILLIAM SILAS CASE, 
Defendant/Appel1 ant 
U s e No. 860263 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence imposed 
for Aggravated Assault, a Felony of the Third Degree, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated, §76-5-103 (1953 as amended). 
The Defendant was found guilty following a jury trial which 
occurred on April 15 and 16, 1986 in th£ Third District Court, in 
and for Tooele County, State of Utah, the Honorable John A. 
Rokich, Judge, presiding. The same court on May 12, 1986 
sentenced the Defendant to a term of not to exceed five (5) years 
in the Utah State Prison. An appeal was taken to this Court. 
Statement of Facts 
The defendant, WILLIAM SILAS CASE, a trucker, was 
1 
staying over at the Lakepoint Truck Stop in Tooele County because 
of bad winter road conditions (R.146-147). He met SUZANNE 
McPHERSON on or about the 6th day of February, 1986. Ms. 
McPherson was a 28-year-old female who had been hitchhiking with 
truckers to travel across the country (R.147 and Exhibit 40, the 
taped preliminary examination testimony). 
The defendant stated that Ms. McPherson was depressed, 
suicidal and frightened and he was trying to help her out by 
giving her a room and some food (R.146-150, 1 5 4 - 1 5 5 ) . The 
defendant stated that in her depressed state that she had 
attempted suicide and he became involved in a scuffle with her to 
take the knife away from her and stop the bleeding (R.162-163). 
Ms. McPherson accused him of assaulting her with a knife 
(Exhibit 4 0 ) . 
This incident occurred on the evening of February 6, 
1986 in a motel room by the truck stop at Lakepoint, Utah. When 
the Tooele County Sheriff's deputies arrived, Ms. McPherson was 
in the motel manager's office (R.60-61) and the defendant met the 
sheriff's office personnel out on the balcony outside the door of 
the motel room where the incident was to have occurred ( R . 6 2 ) . 
The door to the room was only partially opened ( R . 6 4 ) . Without 
asking the defendant's permission or obtaining his consent and 
without obtaining a warrant to search the room, the sheriff's 
2 
deputies entered the room and conducted a search and took 
pictures and obtained evidence that was used at trial over the 
objection of defendant's counsel (R.63-65, 68-72, 7 - 8 ) . 
The alleged victim appeared and testified at the 
preliminary examination on February 18, 1986 but did not appear 
on the day of the trial ( R . 2 - 3 ) . Ms. McPherson had not been 
subpoenaed to appear. Instead, the State relied on her promise 
to appear ( R . 2 0 ) . The Court, without adequately inquiring into 
the defendant's "unavailability" or the reasons given for Ms. 
McPherson's failure to appear at trial, allowed the preliminary 
examination testimony of the alleged victim to be used at the 
time of trial over the objection of defense counsel (R.2-6, 
1 4 - 3 1 ) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The defendant, WILLIAM SILAS CASE, first contends that 
the District Court erred by allowing testimony and evidence 
relating to the search of the motel room. No search warrant was 
obtained and no "exigent circumstances") were presented which 
would have justified a warrantless search. 
Next, the defendant contends that the preliminary 
examination testimony of the prosecuting witness should not have 
been received by the District Court. This receipt violated the 
defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him. 
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Furthermore, the District Court should not have received the 
preliminary examination testimony because it was hearsay and the 
witness was not legally "unavailable as a witness" under Rule 804 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE WHICH 
WAS THE RESULT OF THE WARRANTLESS AND UNREASONABLE 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHIN THE DEFENDANT'S MOTEL 
ROOM. 
The Fourth Amendment protection of the United States 
Constitution and the protection of Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah State Constitution regarding unreasonable and warrantless 
search and seizures have been applied to motel and hotel rooms as 
a person has an expectation of privacy while occupying said 
premises. (68 AmJur 2d, Searches and Seizures §18, 86 ALR 2d 984 
et seq.) This constitutional protection was specifically held to 
extend to hotel and motel rooms by this Court in State v. Folkes, 
565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) , wherein the Court stated as 
follows: 
We are committed unreservedly to the 
protection of the right of privacy by guarding 
against any unwarranted intrusions upon the 
peace and dignity of persons in their homes, 
hotel rooms or wherever they are lawfully 
entitled to be in private. There can be no 
doubt that officers should not take it upon 
themselves to decide whether to enter such a 
sanctuary without a warrant when it is 
reasonably practical to obtain one. 
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In the Folkes case, the Court did not exclude the 
evidence because of its reliance on the plain view doctrine. 
However, the Court did extend protection to any situation or 
circumstance where a person has an expectation of privacy, and 
recognized the importance of requiring officers to obtain 
warrants and rely on the independent and protecting judgment of a 
magistrate to determine probable cause for the obtaining of a 
warrant. 
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al of defendant's motion to suppress on 
at of probable cause. Furthermore, the 
iring the defense counsel to establish 
the absence of probable cause rather than placing the burden of 
showing correct police conduct on the State. Probable cause is 
the standard for the judge issuing a warrant, not the standard 
for a warrantless search by officers. In fact, a warrantless 
search is per se unconstitutional. This Court in State v. 
Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984) stated: 
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se 
unreasonable unless exigent circumstances 
require action before a warrant can be 
obtai ned. 
As in Chri stensen, the State in this case failed to 
establish the lawfulness of this search but, instead, focused on 
probable cause which is not the proper standard. 
In interpreting and setting forth the constitutional 
requirements of our state and federal constitutions for 
warrantless search, the most enlightening case is State v. 
Harri s, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) . That was a case where officers 
had been called to Mr. Harris 1 property by a neighbor who 
complained that Mr. Harris was growing marijuana plants. The 
officers attempted to observe the garden area of Mr. Harris 1 
property from the neighbor's yard and then from Mr. Harris 1 
driveway. The police entered the backyard of Mr. Harris 1 home 
and were asked to leave. The officers discussed the propriety of 
obtaining a warrant and decided not to do so; reentered the 
backyard, arrested Mr. Harris and then obtained samples of the 
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alleged marijuana plants to be analyzed. Later, a search warrant 
was obtained to search inside the home pf the defendant. This 
case is the authority, so to speak, in Utah on warrantless 
search. Justice Howe states: 
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The officers in this case would have had probable cause 
to obtain a search warrant but this alone is not sufficient to 
search as stated in the Harri s case at 179 and 180: 
[They may have]...had probable cause to have a 
search warrant issued. But probable cause 
alone is never enough to search for and seize 
contraband without a warrant. If it were, the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment would be 
rendered a nullity and probable cause alone 
would make all warrantless searches per se 
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reasonable. Cooli dge, supra. Absent exigent 
circumstances, a warrantless entry to search 
for weapons or contraband is unconstitutional, 
even when a felony has been committed and 
there is probable cause to believe that 
incriminating evidence will be found within. 
Payton v, New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 
1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). 
In the Harri s case at 179, Justice Howe lists five 
situations where "exigent circumstances" may exist in order to 
conduct a warrantless search. The State has the burden to 
establish the circumstances that would justify a warrantless 
search. The five areas are: (1) consent, (2) hot pursuit, (3) 
public places, (4) plain view after lawful intrusions, (5) 
incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause under exigent 
circumstances. Each of these exceptions is addressed below as 
they relate to the instant case. 
1. Consent: No consent was obtained in the instant 
case ( R . 6 4 ) . Therefore, this exception does not apply here. 
2. Hot Pursuit: The defendant met the officers outside 
the room--in effect, surrendering himself to the officers. There 
was no chase, no "hot" pursuit into the motel room or any other 
circumstance that would require the officers to enter the motel 
room (R . 6 4 ) . 
3. Public Places: In the Folkes case cited above, this 
Court has recognized the expectation of privacy and protection 
afforded to hotel and motel rooms and the guests occupying them. 
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Thus, the motel room searched in this case was not a public place 
and the warrantless search cannot be justied under this 
exception. 
4. Plain View After Lawful Intrusion: In this case, 
this exception fails because the intrusion by the officers was 
not lawful. The door was only partially open ( R . 6 4 ) . The victim 
was in another room. The officer did not indicate that he saw 
anything at all in the room until after he entered the room 
without permission or any other proper justification. In most 
instances, the lawful intrusion is supplied by a warrant and the 
evidence that is seized under this exception is not listed in the 
warrant and is seen in plain view by thp officer being where he 
had a right to be. 
Commenting on similar circumstances of a warrantless 
search without permission in the Harri s case where plain view was 
argued by the state to justify the seizure of evidence, Justice 
Howe states at 181: 
To accede to the State's construction of the 
plain view doctrine would be tantamount to 
ignoring the maxim that plain view never 
occurs until a lawful search (usually under 
warrant) is in progress, and may not be used 
by government officials to bootstrap 
themselves into an exploratory search until 
they find what they are looking for. MAny 
evidence will be in plain view, at least at 
the moment of seizure". Cooli dge, supra, 403 
U.S. at 465, 91 S.Ct. at 2037, 29 L.Ed.2d at 
582. The "plain view" doctrine comes into 
play only where the observation made is 
postintrusive. Pre-instrusive observations 
merely give rise to probable cause. 
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The evidence in this case of the statements of the 
alleged victim and the bloody footsteps in "plain view" give rise 
to probable cause which would be justification to obtain a 
warrant to enter the room and continue the criminal investigation 
there with a search warrant. Instead, here we have an uninvited 
intrusion to find evidence in "plain view". The circumstances 
here fail justify a warrantless search. 
5. Incident to a Lawful Arrest Based on Probable Cause 
Under Exigent Circumstances: In the present case, the officers 
had probable cause based on the alleged victim's statements and 
the bloodied footprints to arrest the defendant. However, the 
State failed to establish the exigent circumstances requirement 
to search pursuant to a lawful arrest. The Court in Harri s 
established the criteria for a search incident to arrest at 180: 
The underlying justifications for a 
warrantless search of an arrestee's person and 
the area within his immediate control are two-
fold: (1) to remove weapons the arrestee may 
use to resist an arrest or effect an escape, 
(2) to prevent concealment or destruction of 
evidence linking the arrestee with the crime. 
Neither situation obtained here. The 
defendant lived alone, the plants were well 
established in the garden, and there was no 
danger of their destruction, let alone their 
concealment. Further, they were not within 
his immediate control where he was arrested. 
In the instant case, the defendant was out on the 
balcony in front of the motel room when he was arrested with no 
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weapon and he was secured before the officer entered the room. 
The victim was in the manager's office. No destruction of 
evidence was foreseeable nor under the defendant's control where 
he was arrested. The search pursuant to a lawful arrest fails 
here as in Harri s because the state has failed to establish 
exigent circumstances which would justify a warrantless search. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING THE ALLEGED 
VICTIM'S PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION TESTIMONY. 
Article I, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution and the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution 
insure the defendant the right to be confronted by his accusers 
and to examine them. This right was violated by the Court 
receiving the preliminary examination testimony. 
Rule 8 0 4 ( b ) ( 1 ) , Utah Rules of Evidence, allows former 
testimony to be received at a subsequent proceeding and the 
testimony is "not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant 
is unavailable as a witness." Rule 8 0 4 ( a ) ( 5 ) , Utah Rules of 
Evidence, defines "unavailability" as follows: 
"Unavailability as a witness" includes 
situations in which the declarant...(5) is 
absent from the hearing and the proponent of 
his statement has been unable to procure his 
attendance by process or other reasonable 
means. 
The key issue is this case under this rule and the 
constitutional guarantee is whether the State's efforts to obtain 
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the witness were reasonable. 
The facts of this case show that the victim was very 
transitory and claimed some fear of the defendant and had 
expressed to the officers some reluctance to testifying (R.20, 
2 6 ) . Despite this, no effort was made by the prosecution to have 
a subpoena served on the victim. On this issue, the Supreme 
Court has spoken in State v. Oniskor, 510 P.2d 929 (Utah 1973) 
which, though prior to the adoption of the present Rules of 
Evidence, stated, in effect, if the State has not made a good-
faith effort to obtain the presence of a witness including 
subpoenaing the out-of-state witness, the testimony should not be 
allowed. The Court found in that case that the testimony should 
have been excluded, but it was harmless error not to exclude it 
because several other witnesses testified to the same facts. 
That certainly is not so in the instant case because the alleged 
victim's testimony was of paramount importance to the conviction 
of the defendant and, in fact, the tape recording received as an 
exhibit was taken by the jury to the jury room and we can assume 
they listened to it again. 
The Court in Oni skor at 931 stated: 
The instant action bears a strong similarity 
to Berger v. California, wherein a state 
investigator located the witness in Colorado, 
but the State failed to serve a subpoena on 
him. The court vacated the judgment and 
remanded the case to be reconsidered in light 
of Barber v. Page. The court observed that 
one of the important objectives of the right 
12 
of confrontation was to guarantee that the 
fact finder had an adequate opportunity to 
assess the credibility of witnesses. In the 
instant action, the State failed to sustain 
its burden that it had made a good-faith 
effort to secure the attendance of the witness 
and had been unsuccessful. The use of the 
depositions at the trial constituted a denial 
of defendant's constitutional right of 
confrontation. However, the testimony of 
these two absent witnesses was merely 
cumulative since others also testified to 
essentially the same facts. A survey of the 
record reveals that the other evidence against 
defendant was so overwhelming that this court 
is compelled to conclude beyond a resonable 
doubt that the denial of defendant's rights 
constituted harmless error. 
Hoping that the witness would appear when the 
prosecution could have required her presence by subpoena was not 
reasonable, especially in light of the past history of this 
wi tness. 
The Supreme Court more recently addressed this issue in 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1 9 8 1 ) . In that case the 
prosecution put on testimony that the witness had basically 
disappeared, that an officer had contacted all known relatives, 
likely hangouts, local bus terminals, arid out-of-state police and 
could not find the witness, and, there, the trial judge found and 
the Supreme Court concurred, that this was sufficient good-faith 
effort and the issuing of the subpoena would be worthless to 
establish unavailability because they could not locate the 
witness to serve the witness with a subooena. That is clearly 
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not the case here. The State witness testified that the alleged 
victim had a telephone number and address and the State had had 
several telephone contacts with her, but they did not subpoena 
her to trial (R.16-19). The witness appeared at the preliminary 
examination because she was properly subpoenaed. She could have 
been subpoenaed to the trial very easily before she left the 
state. She should not properly have been considered 
"unavailable" and her preliminary examination testimony should 
not have been used. (See 38 ALR 4th 362 and 3 ALR 4th 73, 
especi ally §11) 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant, WILLIAM SILAS 
CASE, seeks reversal of his conviction and remand of his case to 
the District Court with an order for new trial. 
1A& 
Respectfully submitted this day of October, 
1986. 
FRANK T. MOHLMAN 
Attorney for Defendant, Appellant 
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